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A recurrent dilemma in team management is to select between a team-based and an individual-
based wage scheme. We explore such a dilemma in a simple model of production in teams, in 
which the team members may diﬀer in their eﬀort choices and qualiﬁcation. We show that, in 
spite of enhancing output as the basis for payment, a team-based wage scheme might be less 
proﬁtable for the principal than an individual-based wage scheme. We also highlight a deep 
misalignment between designing optimal (output-based) incentives for a team and treating its 
members impartially. Finally, upon introducing the possibility of liquidity constraints in our 
model, we provide rationale for the so-called “rich get richer” hypothesis. 
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A large theoretical literature has emphasized how employers design compen-
sation contracts to induce employees to operate in their interests (see, for
instance, Prendergast (1999) and the references cited therein). It is typically
assumed that workers respond to incentives and that, in particular, paying
on the basis of output induces workers to supply more output (e.g., Lazear,
2000). When rms can accurately measure the contribution of individual
workers simple piece-rate incentive plans have proven to be eective, pro-
vided there is careful measurement of output (e.g., Baker, 1992; Nagin et
al., 2002). There are some features of employment relationships, though,
that limit the eectiveness of simple piece-rate incentive pay plans and that
force managers to consider other forms of incentive pay (e.g., Ichniowski
and Shaw, 2003). For instance, in many production processes, output is a
function not of the eort of a single worker, but of the combined eort of
many workers, and the reward for participation in such teams is likely to be
some form of group-based pay (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).
In this paper, we present a simple model of production in teams to ex-
plore the dilemma for a principal between guaranteeing (deserving) workers
a xed wage, or making wages contingent on collective (besides individual)
performance. The dilemma can be interpreted as a choice between a team-
based or an individual-based wage scheme for the management of teams.
More precisely, imagine a project that has to be managed by a team of
agents each of whom is responsible for a dierent task. Agents (who might
dier in their skills) decide whether to exert eort or not in order to perform
their tasks. Exerting eort is a costly action and the higher the skill, the
lower the cost. The overall project succeeds with a probability which is an
increasing function of the number of agents exerting eort.
The principal (who knows each agent's skill and observes each agent's
eort) chooses between two management scenarios. In the rst one, the
principal designs a mechanism rewarding agents exerting eort only if the
project ends successfully. In the second one, the scheme is not contingent
and therefore the principal rewards (deserving) agents independently of the
success of the overall project.
We show in this paper that the dilemma is tilted in favor of the second
management scenario, which is typically more protable for the principal.
More precisely, we show that, under general conditions, the expected benets
of a principal are lower under the contingent scenario than under the non-
contingent one. As a byproduct of our analysis, we will also show that
agents have the dual preferences over the two scenarios. That is, they prefer
1the contingent scenario, as their expected benets will be lower under the
contingent scenario than under the non-contingent one.
These results have implications that might even be seen as counterintu-
itive at rst sight. On the one hand, we obtain that, when it comes to the
management of teams, naive stimulus measures, such as making payments
contingent to the overall success of the team project, might not necessarily
be a good option for the principal. On the other hand, agents would typ-
ically prefer a scheme that, albeit risky, would enhance incentives further,
rather than a scheme guaranteeing them a secure wage.
Our analysis will also provide rationale for the so-called \rich get richer"
hypothesis. In a market economy, there is no clear implication as to whether
economic activities will tend to reduce or else to widen initial wealth dis-
parities (e.g., Durham et al., 1998). The so-called Paradox of Power (e.g.,
Hirshleifer, 1991) is the observation that poorer or weaker contestants im-
prove their position relative to richer or stronger opponents. Nevertheless,
in some social and economic contexts the reverse occurs, i.e., initially richer
and/or more powerful contestants do exploit weaker rivals and thus the rich
get richer.1 Our model and results take a side on this debate upon endorsing
the latter instance. To elaborate on this, one just has to assume the exis-
tence of liquidity constraints in our model. For instance, think of the case
of start-up companies without enough stock resources to face wages if there
is a team failure (i.e., rewards could not exceed the revenues of the team).
In such a case, the principal would be forced to the contingent management
option described above. Our results would therefore tell us that a princi-
pal without liquidity constraints is likely to obtain higher expected benets
than a principal with liquidity constraints, which is to be interpreted as an
instance of the \rich get richer" hypothesis.
As it can be inferred from the above, this paper deals with team manage-
ment, a topic that has been the object of intense study in economics since
Marschak (1955).2 Holmstrom (1982) initiated the interest on moral-hazard
problems within teams, an aspect that has received considerable attention
1For instance, the accruing of greater increments of recognition for particular scientic
contributions to scientists of considerable repute and the withholding of such recognition
from scientists who have not yet made their mark, was already reported in the sociology
of science long time ago (e.g., Merton, 1968). Similarly, in the literature on networks, the
counterpart to this hypothesis refers to the idea that nodes gain new links with probabili-
ties that are proportional to the number of links that they already have. This hypothesis
is widely accepted as the explanation for the occurrence of node connectivities following a
power-law distribution in systems as diverse as genetic networks, citation networks or the
World Wide Web (e.g., Barab asi and Albert, 1999).
2See Marschak and Radner (1972) for a comprehensive survey.
2ever since (e.g., McAfee and McMillan, 1991; Itoh, 1993; Che and Yoo, 2001;
Winter, 2004). In our case, the moral-hazard problem is absent as agents'
eort is observable. This feature allows us to scrutinize the robustness of
some of the results obtained in the mentioned literature. For instance, Win-
ter (2004) argues that even when agents are identical and act simultaneously
(i.e., with no information among peers) the principal may gain by discrimi-
nating among them. Nevertheless, this feature happens in Winter's model if
and only if technology functions exhibit decreasing returns of scale, whereas,
as we shall show later, in our model this feature occurs without imposing
additional conditions whatsoever on the technology functions.
Our benchmark model relies on some key assumptions, such as agents'
neutrality to risk; a at (as opposed to hierarchical) organization of the team;
the viability of wage schemes, or the use of the Nash equilibrium concept
to design them. We, nonetheless, explore the extensions of our benchmark
model in each of the corresponding directions that arise when relaxing each
of these assumptions. In doing so, we test the robustness of our results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the
benchmark model. In Section 3, we obtain the main results of the paper.
In Section 4 we address some extensions of the benchmark model and their
corresponding results. We conclude in Section 5.
2 The benchmark model
There is a project involving n activities performed by n agents of a team.
Each agent decides simultaneously whether to exert eort (invest) or not
towards the performance of her activity.3 We denote by i 2 f0;1g the eort
decision of agent i, where i = 1 (0) if player i does (not) exert eort. The
cost of exerting eort of agent i is ci. This parameter is to be interpreted as
a sign of the agent's skill (i.e., the lower the cost of exerting eort, the higher
the skill). We assume, without loss of generality, that c1  c2    cn. An
agent will invest if and only if her expected benets (i.e., her expected wage
minus her cost) are non-negative.4 The project's technology is a strictly
increasing function p : f0;1;:::;ng ! [0;1] specifying the probability of
success for any given number of agents exerting eort. In doing so, we are
3This is a way of modeling the fact that the team has a at (rather than hierarchical)
organization. In doing so, we are implicitly assuming that communication among agents
does not necessarily exist (perhaps reecting geographical constraints) and that individual
eort choices might not be observed by the other agents.
4We assume all agents are risk neutral. We will elaborate on this assumption later in
the text.
3implicitly assuming that agents' eorts are equally valuable for the success
of the project.
A principal observes agents' skills and eort decisions, and designs the
wage scheme for the team with the aim of maximizing her benets. Let
 > 0 denote the proceeds for the principal if the project is successful and
assume that an unsuccessful project yields 0. Agents are subject to limited
liability, which means that the principal cannot impose negative wages on
them.5 Let !i  0 denote agent i's wage, which will obviously depend on i's
eort decision.6 The principal will have two options to design the scheme
f!igi2N. One in which wages are conditional on the success of the project,
which can therefore be considered as a team-based scheme, and another
in which they are not, which can therefore be considered as an individual-
based scheme. Under each option, the principal will have an optimal group
of agents K  N she would like to see exerting eort. If the principal obeys


















where, in each case, k denotes the cardinality of K.7 The value of k solving
a program of this sort will be referred to as the optimal size of the team.
In order to solve the above optimization problems, we shall need to con-
struct the mechanism that induces agents within a given group (and only
them) to exert eort at the minimum possible cost. A mechanism achiev-
ing such an aim will be called an optimal investment-inducing mechanism.
Note that any given wage scheme denes a game. An investment-inducing
mechanism for a group of agents K would be a wage scheme for which its cor-
responding game would have a unique Nash equilibrium in which all agents
in K, and only them, exert eort. The optimal investment-inducing mech-
5Limited liability of the agents may arise from workers' having the freedom to quit or
from institutional constraints such as laws banning rms' exacting payments from workers.
In any case, dropping this assumption would not alter the message of our results.
6Note that, given the assumptions, it is natural to assume that !i = 0 for each i such
that i = 0.
7At the risk of stressing the obvious, note that the values of !i in (1) and (2) will not
coincide and that, therefore, the corresponding optimal sets (and their cardinalities) in
each program need not be the same.
4anism for K would be the least expensive investment-inducing mechanism
for K.
Once the above optimization problems are solved, the corresponding
wage schemes are easily described. More precisely, let K1 and K2 denote
the optimal groups obtained from (1) and (2) respectively, and f!1
i gi2N
and f!2
i gi2N denote the corresponding optimal investment-inducing mech-











2 if i = 1 and i 2 K2,
0 otherwise.
3 The main results
We start this section exploring the principal's behavior under both scenarios.
Proposition 1 The following statements hold:












2. If wages are not contingent on the project's success the principal solves
max
k=0;1;:::;n




Proof. Since the second statement of the proposition is straightforward,
we focus on the rst one. Let (!1;!2;:::;!n) be a scheme inducing a game
whose unique Nash equilibrium is (1;2;:::;n) = (1;1;:::;1). Then, in
particular, (1;2;:::;n) = (0;0;:::;0) is not a Nash equilibrium for that
game, which implies that there exists, at least, an agent i1 2 N wanting
5to deviate by investing. In other words, there exists i1 2 N for which





Let us consider now the prole (1;2;:::;n) in which i1 = 1 and i = 0
otherwise.10 Since this prole cannot be an equilibrium either, it follows that
there exists an agent i2 2 N nfi1g wanting to deviate by investing. In other





This argument can be subsequently repeated for the remaining proles to


































is the optimal investment-inducing mechanism for N (together with the
schemes obtained by permuting indices corresponding to agents with a same
cost, which would also generate the same overall wage).
8Note that if i1 deviates there would only be one agent exerting eort, which would
make p(1) the probability of success and therefore the probability for agent i1 of getting
a positive wage !i1.
9Note that this condition guarantees that exerting eort is a dominant strategy for
agent i1.
10Note that (5) not only guarantees that the prole in which no agent exerts eort is
not a Nash equilibrium, but also that no prole in which only one agent (dierent from
i1) exerts eort constitutes a Nash equilibrium either.
11Note that if i2 deviates there would be only two agents exerting eort, which would
make p(2) the probability of success and therefore the probability for agent i2 of getting
a positive wage !i2.
6Thus, it follows from there that the optimal wage scheme to guarantee





for all i 2 K, where (i) denotes the rank of i in K, and !i = 0 for all i = 2 K.
Therefore, among the sets with the same cardinality of K, the optimal one












We now compare the objective functions in the statement of Proposition













with a strict inequality for any k > 1. This proves the following corollary:
Corollary 1 The principal gets higher expected benets when wages are not
contingent on the project's success.
Corollary 1 shows the superiority of what we called the non-contingent
option. In other words, the principal would prefer guaranteeing workers
a salary with no risk whatsoever rather than enhancing incentives further
upon linking wages to (collective) performance. Corollary 1 also says, in
particular, that when the principal faces liquidity constraints in the design
of the wage scheme (i.e., she is forced to make wages contingent on the
project's success) then she typically obtains lower benets than without
liquidity constraints (and therefore avoiding contingency on the project's
success). Thus, Corollary 1 can provide rationale for the so-called \rich get
richer" hypothesis, as a \rich" principal (e.g., a company with enough stock
resources) increases her benets with respect to a \poor" principal (e.g., a
start-up company) without the option of oering a wage scheme deprived of
contingencies.
Proposition 1 also provides information regarding the preferences of the
team members. More precisely, it shows that the expected benets for each
7agent are always 0 under the non-contingent management strategy, whereas
under the contingent strategy this is only the case if the agent does not
belong to the optimal set K = f1;2;:::;kg. Otherwise, agent i 2 K gets







Thus, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 2 Agents get higher expected benets when wages are contingent
on the project's success.
Corollary 2 illustrates how principal and agents have opposite preferences
regarding management strategies. It says that (risk-neutral) agents prefer
a scheme that, albeit risky, would enhance incentives further, rather than a
scheme guaranteeing them a secure wage.
The information provided by Proposition 1 regarding agents' (expected)
wages shows another interesting feature. On the one hand, we observe that
with the optimal non-contingent wage scheme agents would end up receiving
the same (actually, zero) benets despite having dierent skills (and there-
fore receiving dierent wages). Thus, it would be, ex-post, an (extremely)
egalitarian scheme. Things, however, dier with the optimal contingent
wage scheme. In such a case, the expected benets in equilibrium of an
agent i exerting eort, would be







where, recall that K = f1;2;:::;kg is the set of agents exerting eort, and
therefore i 2 K. This implies that agents would typically end up receiving
not only dierent wages, but also dierent (and positive) benets. In other
words, the optimal contingent wage scheme is not only inegalitarian ex-ante,
but also ex-post. As a matter of fact, the inegalitarian aspect of this scheme
is obvious as it violates the most fundamental notion of horizontal equity:
Corollary 3 The contingent wage scheme violates equal treatment of equals
both from an ex-ante and an ex-post viewpoint.
More precisely, Corollary 3 says that, under the optimal contingent wage
scheme, equal agents (in terms of their skills) might not only receive dierent
wages, but also enjoy dierent benets.
We conclude the analysis of the benchmark model by showing another
dierence between both management options.
8Corollary 4 The optimal size of the team when the principal uses the con-
tingent management option is never higher than when using the non-contingent
management option.
Proof. Let us denote by k (b k) the optimal size of the team for a princi-
pal using the contingent management (non-contingent) management option.
Formally, k is the value where (3) is maximized, whereas b k is the value where
(4) is maximized. We show that k  b k. By contradiction, assume that the















































































































9which represents a contradiction, as b k maximizes (4).
Corollary 4 says that the non-contingent management option typically
induces more agents to exert eort. Thus, if the principal values per se that
members of the team exert eort, Corollary 4 shows an additional advantage
of the non-contingent management strategy.
4 Further results
In this section we explore several directions in which our benchmark model
could be extended and obtain the corresponding results.
4.1 Intermediate management strategies
Our benchmark model only considers two extreme cases of management
strategies in which wages are either fully contingent on the project's success
or not contingent at all. A natural question arising from here (and our
previous analysis) is whether our results would extend for intermediate cases
in which wages are only partially contingent on the project's success. More
precisely, assume now that the principal faces some liquidity constraints
and, as a result, only has some stock resources (S), although maybe not
enough to face the salaries of all workers if the project is not successful.
In this context, a semi-contingent management option consists of a scheme
guaranteeing to each deserving agent a fraction si  ci from the stock for
sure, as well as a wage !i contingent on the project's success. That is, a













where K is the group of agents exerting eort and k its cardinality.
A similar argument to the one at the proof of Proposition 1, allows us to
show that, provided (s1;:::;sn) is the allocation of stock resources S, then
the wage scheme to guarantee that agents in K (and only them) exert eort





for all i 2 K, where (i) denotes the rank of i in K, and !i = 0 for all i = 2 K.













where (s1;:::;sn) is such that S =
Pn
i=1 si and the optimal set K is K =
f1;2;:::;kg. Ultimately, this amounts to maximizing
k X
i=1






for all i = 1;:::;k. It is straightforward to show that
1  2    k. Thus, the optimal semi-contingent investment-inducing
mechanism for K = f1;:::;kg is given by














for all i 2 fi0 + 2;:::kg;
where i0 is such that 1  i0  k,
Pi0
i=1 ci  S <
Pi0+1
i=1 ci and r = S   Pi0
i=1 ci.
It is straightforward to show from here that, for S = 0, we obtain
the (contingent) mechanism at statement 1 of Proposition 1, whereas for
S >
Pk
i=1 ci we obtain the (non-contingent) mechanism at statement 2 of
Proposition 1. One can easily conclude that principals prefer non-contingent
mechanisms to semi-contingent mechanisms and these ones to (fully) contin-
gent mechanisms, hence supporting further the \rich get richer" hypothesis
mentioned above.
4.2 Equity constraints
We have shown that optimal (contingent) wage schemes typically sacrice
the idea of equal treatment of equals. This feature can be seen as another
instance of the so-called equality-eciency trade-o (e.g., Okun, 1975). Nev-
ertheless, a wide number of advanced democracies have passed, in the last
decades, bills promoting dierent forms of equality in wage schemes. Thus,
11it might be reasonable to impose in our model some sort of equity constraints
in the design of wage schemes. In this section, we compute the eciency
loss that would arise as a consequence of imposing these constraints.
Let i1; ;ik be the agents for which the cost ranking has a discontinuity,
i.e., i1; ;ik are such that ij  ij + 1 for all j and
c1 = c2 =  = ci1 1 < ci1 = ci1+1 =  = ci2 1 < ci2    cn:
Then, an analogous argument to the proof of Proposition 1 allows us to show
that the following scheme constitutes the optimal contingent mechanism, out













for all i 2 fik;:::ng:
Thus, the existence of equality constraints can exacerbate the eect of liq-
uidity constraints widening the initial wealth disparities that might exist
among principals.
As one might expect, the more demanding is the notion of equality being
considered, the higher the burden for a principal forced to adopt the con-
tingent wage scheme. Instances of more demanding options would be the
so-called weak equity axiom introduced by Sen (1973), which imposes a pos-
itive discrimination towards disabled individuals (to be interpreted in this
model as those with higher costs) or, more generally, the so-called priority
axiom, introduced by Moreno-Ternero and Roemer (2006), which imposes
a reasonable limit on the scope of Sen's axiom, by endorsing the view that
the discrimination in favor of the disabled should never be to the extent of
making the disabled better-o than abler individuals, after the allocation
takes place.12
12It is straightforward to show that the non-contingent wage scheme we have described
would satisfy the priority axiom. As for the contingent wage scheme, it can actually be
shown that, for a given technology function, it satises the priority axiom if and only if the
distribution of skills in the team is suciently dispersed. Thus, in order to be prioritarian
with teams having a low level of skill heterogeneity, the contingent wage scheme should be
modied (at the expense of the principal) which, in other words, says that the imposition
of a more demanding notion of equality (such as the priority axiom), at least under the
presence of low skill heterogeneity, would intensify the eect of liquidity constraints.
124.3 Risk attitudes
Our results are based on the implicit assumption that agents are all risk
neutral. The next result summarizes our ndings for other risk attitudes.
Proposition 2 The following statements hold:
1. If agents are risk averse, the principal gets higher expected benets
when wages are not contingent on the project's success.
2. There is a critical threshold of agents' risk lovingness, above (below)
which the principal gets lower (higher) expected benets when wages
are not contingent on the project's success.
Proof. We start focussing on the case in which agents are (equally) risk
averse. Formally, let u() be each agent's (strictly concave) utility function
over sure prospects. Let (!1;!2;:::;!n) be the scheme inducing a game in
this case, whose unique Nash equilibrium is (1;2;:::;n) = (1;1;:::;1). In
particular, (1;2;:::;n) = (0;0;:::;0) is not a Nash equilibrium for that
game, which implies that there exists, at least, an agent i1 2 N wanting to
deviate by investing. In other words, there exists i1 2 N for which
p(1)ui1(!i1   ci1) + (1   p(1))ui1( ci1)  ui1(0):
Now, due to the strict concavity of ui1(), we have that











where (i) denotes the rank of i in K. Thus, for a given size of the rm (k),

















which shows that the wage scheme would be more expensive under the as-
sumption of risk neutral agents, and which, combined with Corollary 1,
13implies that the principal gets higher expected benets when wages are not
contingent on the project's success.
We now move to the case in which agents are (equally) risk loving. For-
mally, let u() be each agent's (strictly convex) utility function over sure
prospects. Analogously to the previous case, there exists i1 2 N for which
p(1)ui1(!i1   ci1) + (1   p(1))ui1( ci1)  ui1(0): Now, due to the strict
convexity of ui1(), we have that
p(1)ui1(!i1   ci1) + (1   p(1))ui1( ci1) > ui1(p(1)!i1   ci1):






p(1)ui1(!i1   ci1) + (1   p(1))ui1( ci1) = ui1(0):
Obviously, i1 is correlated to the agent's degree of risk lovingness in a
positive way, i.e., the higher the degree of risk lovingness, the higher i1. If
we proceed iteratively, we obtain that the optimal wage scheme to guarantee





for all i 2 K, where (i) denotes the rank of i in K, and !i = 0 for all i = 2 K.













which, combined with Corollary 1, shows that the resulting wage scheme
would be more (less) expensive than the non-contingent wage scheme for low
(high) values of i, i.e., low (high) degrees of risk lovingness. Incidentally,
the argument also shows that there is a sequence of thresholds fig, or,
for that matter, a precise degree of agents' risk lovingness, for which the
principal would be indierent between both management options.
4.4 Optimistic principals
In our analysis, while designing (contingent) investment-inducing mecha-
nisms, we have imposed that the prole in which all agents in a group (and
14only them) exert eort be the only existing (Nash) equilibrium of the game
induced by the corresponding wage scheme. Another (less demanding) op-
tion would be to nd investment-inducing mechanisms where the prole in
which all agents in a group (and only them) exert eort is an equilibrium, but
not necessarily the only one. An interpretation for this alternative option
is that the principal is optimistic and believes that agents will coordinate
on the right equilibrium and therefore does not need to worry about the
other existing equilibria. In other words, the principal is not concerned with
the strategic uncertainty induced by the presence of multiple equilibria and,
more precisely, by the existence of an equilibrium in which no agent exerts
eort. We show next that this change alters our results substantially.
Let us start by noting that if a principal in this new setting commits
to reward agents independently of the project's success, nothing changes,
i.e., the optimal way to do so is also by rewarding each (deserving) agent
within the optimal set with her cost and giving nothing to all other agents.
Formally, the principal would solve
max
k=0;1;:::;n








ci if i = 1 and i 2 f1;:::;b kg,
0 otherwise.
However, if the principal makes wages contingent on the project's suc-

















p(e k) if i = 1, i 2 f1;:::;e kg, and the project is successful,
0 otherwise.
It is not dicult to show that there is indeed strategic uncertainty for
the above wage scheme as two equilibria arise; namely, the one in which all
agents shirk and the one in which all agents receiving a positive wage exert
15eort.13 It is also easy to show that this is indeed the cheapest wage scheme
supporting the existence of an equilibrium in which all agents in a given
group exert eort.
It follows from the above that the objective function in programs (12) and
(13) is the same, which implies that the expected benets for an optimistic
principal are the same no matter whether she makes wages contingent on the
project's success or not. In particular, this shows that the eect of liquidity
constraints would be mitigated at the cost of assuming strategic uncertainty
in the design of contingent wage schemes.
4.5 Flat Vs. Hierarchical structures
Our benchmark model has assumed a at organization for the team. As
mentioned above, this could be interpreted as a way of assuming that com-
munication among agents does not necessarily exist (perhaps reecting ge-
ographical constraints) and that, therefore, individual eort choices might
not be observed by the other agents. Nevertheless, an alternative option
would be to assume a hierarchical organization in which agents instead of
performing their tasks simultaneously do so sequentially. That is, agents
would decide sequentially (instead of simultaneously) whether to exert ef-
fort or not towards the performance of their activity. In such a case, the
natural equilibrium notion to be used, while designing mechanisms, would
be the so-called subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
As before, if the principal aims to induce agents exert eort (at the
minimum possible cost) commiting to reward them independently of the
project's success, then the optimal way to do so would be by rewarding each
(deserving) agent within the optimal set with her cost and giving nothing
to all other agents.
However, if the principal makes wages contingent on the project's suc-
cess, then the optimal wage scheme to guarantee that agents in K (and only





for all i 2 K, where k denotes the cardinality of K, and !i = 0 for all
i = 2 K.14
13Note that an agent i would deviate from the prole in which all agents shirk only if
p(1)!i  ci or, equivalently, !i 
ci
p(1). Now, if e k  2 (otherwise the scheme is identical




p(e k), which shows that no deviation would occur.
14Note that the location of agents in the hierarchy does not aect this result.
16Thus, an analogous argument to the one in the previous section would
allow us to show that the objective function the principal faces to determine
the optimal set is the same for both cases, which therefore implies that
the expected benets for a principal of a hierarchical organization would be
independent of the fact that wages are contingent on the project's success.
Again, as before, this shows that the eect of liquidity constraints in our
model of team production would be alleviated were principals allowed to
freely design the architecture of their rms.
4.6 More exible management strategies
Our analysis of contingent wage schemes has imposed that individual con-
tracts depend only on the individual eort decision and the success (or
failure) of the joint venture, which could be considered as a public signal.
This might partially be justied on the grounds that agents (ex post) neither
observe their peers' decisions nor the realization of their wages, and there-
fore would not nd credible contingent contracts depending on additional
aspects to the ones just mentioned.
Nevertheless, one might think of alternative contexts of team production
in which more exibility is allowed while designing wage schemes, and ad-
ditional information (e.g., private signals that only the principal observes)
might be considered. If so, as we show next, and similarly to what we ob-
tain in the previous sections, the principal would be indierent between a
contingent scheme and a non-contingent scheme and, therefore, the eect of
liquidity constraints would also be mitigated. More precisely, consider the













and let b k denote the total number of agents exerting eort within the team
(i.e., b k =
P
i2N i). Then, consider the following wage scheme, described by
a menu of options depending on b k,




p(b k) if i = 1, i 2 f1;:::;e kg, and the project is successful,
0 otherwise.
Note that, with this scheme, individual contracts not only depend on
the individual eort decision and the success (or failure) of the team, but
17also on the number of agents in the team who actually exerted eort, as
described in the above menu. It is clear that, on the equilibrium path, i.e.,
when the agents exerting eort are those in f1;:::;e kg, and therefore, b k = e k,
the scheme coincides with the one described in Section 4.4. However, the
strategic uncertainty inherent there does not occur here, thanks to the o-
equilibrium path. More precisely, an agent i would deviate from the prole
in which all agents shirk only if p(1)!i  ci or, equivalently, !i  ci
p(1), which
is precisely the amount that this scheme guarantees to agent i, provided she
is the only one exerting eort. A similar argument allows to show that no
other prole with some agents in f1;:::;e kg shirking is an equilibrium, and
that the prole in which all agents in f1;:::;e kg exert eort is indeed the
unique equilibrium (being the scheme described above the cheapest one to
achieve that goal).
It then follows that the overall wage the principal faces turns out to
be the same than the one under the non-contingent scenario, which shows
that allowing more exibility to design contingent contracts (in particular, to
consider the menu described above) also vanishes the comparative advantage
of the individual-based wage scheme we have considered throughout this
paper.
5 Discussion
We have analyzed in this paper a simple model of organization and shown
that an optimal management strategy for team production may involve guar-
anteeing workers a xed wage, rather than linking wages to collective (be-
sides individual) performance.15 This implies, in particular, that when the
principal faces liquidity constraints (and therefore is forced to link wages
to the team's performance) then she is expected to obtain lower benets
than without liquidity constraints. Thus, we provide rationale for the so-
called \rich get richer" hypothesis. Our nding can also be interpreted as
an argument to endorse individual-based wage schemes rather than team-
based wage schemes for the management of teams in which agents dier in
their qualication and eort choices. This is in line with some related lit-
erature in which it has been suggested that team-based compensation gives
rise to problems when workers vary in their ability (e.g., Prendergast, 1999;
Meidinger et al., 2003).
Furthermore, we show a deep misalignment between optimal team-based
15Our dichotomy is also reminiscent of the so-called make-or-buy decision in the theory
of the rm (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1994).
18compensation schemes and an impartial treatment of its members. More pre-
cisely, in our model, an optimal team-based compensation scheme violates
equal treatment of equals. In other words, equally talented (and deserving)
agents might well receive dierent wages and end up with dierent benets.
Discriminating among equals in a team production model is a feature already
obtained by Winter (2004) in the case in which principals only care about
making all agents exert eort. Nevertheless, Winter (2004) only obtains this
feature for the case in which production functions exhibit increasing returns
of scale, whereas we obtain it here without imposing additional conditions
on the production function.16
We have also shown that if the team is managed under a prot-sharing
plan, less agents are expected to exert eort, which might be considered
as an additional advantage of individual-based wage schemes for team pro-
duction. The lack of success of prot-sharing plans in fostering individual
eort, within a context of teams, has been observed, for instance, in medical
practices (e.g., Newhouse, 1973) or partnerships in law rms (e.g., Leibowitz
and Tollison, 1980).
Our main nding is robust to the extension of our benchmark model in
three directions; namely, the existence of intermediate management options
(with semi-contingent mechanisms), agents' aversion to risk, and equity con-
straints. On the other hand, it is not robust to the extension in three other
directions. More precisely, one amounts to assume a hierarchical (rather
than a at) organization for the team. This, however, seems to be an un-
realistic assumption nowadays, where hierarchies are being challenged from
below or are transforming themselves from top-down structures into more
horizontal and collaborative ones (e.g., Friedman, 2007). Another amounts
to assume the existence of optimistic principals, who might be satised with
guaranteeing that all agents exerting eort is an equilibrium, but not the
only one. The aw of this option is its inherent strategic uncertainty induced
by the existence of multiple equilibria (and, in particular, the equilibrium in
which no agent exerts eort).17 A third one amounts to assume more ex-
ibility in the design of contingent wage schemes upon allowing contracts to
oer a menu of options depending on the number of agents exerting eort,
16It is worth remarking that Winter (2004) analyzes a dierent model in which the
principal does not observe agents' eort decisions and hence the moral-hazard problem
becomes the priority of the analysis.
17This feature is somehow reminiscent of the literature on public goods (see, for instance,
Ledyard (1995) for an excellent survey) in which voluntary contributions mechanisms, that
might yield strategic uncertainty, are considered as a way of combating the free-riding
equilibrium.
19which might be plausible in some instances, although not always. Alto-
gether, it can be safely argued that even though liquidity constraints can
have an important eect in the rise of initial wealth disparities, the more
freedom we provide a principal with (either by allowing dierent team archi-
tectures, strategic uncertainty, or more exibility in the design of contracts)
the more she can mitigate their eect.
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